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Abstract

THE ROLE OF ENCODING SPECIFICITY IN INCIDENTAL LEARNING:
IMPLICATIONS FOR EXPLICIT AND IMPLICIT FALSE MEMORIES

Cassady McLaughlin

This research investigated false memories via spreading activation and the
influence of encoding specificity on explicit and implicit memory tests in incidental
learning situations. It was hypothesized that congruent conditions would have higher
rates of both false memories for associated items as well as more accurate memories for
presented items. It was also expected that this effect would be larger among those in
implicit memory conditions compared to explicit conditions. The participants (n=175)
were presented with Deese-Roediger-McDermott semantically associated word lists via a
Stroop task, in which they were not told to remember the words presented, but to instead
identify the font color of the word. The font color of the presented word lists was either
the same (congruent) between the learning and memory tests, or it was different
(incongruent). With respect to false memory, a significant interaction for memory
condition and font color was found, such that those in the implicit condition had more
false memories for non-presented words when in the incongruent font color condition,
and those in the explicit condition had more false memories when in the congruent font
color condition. Regarding memory accuracy, both those in the implicit and explicit
ii

conditions had more accurate memories when in the congruent font color condition.
Overall, the explicit condition had more false memories and more accurate memories
than those in the implicit condition. This research shows that significant differences exist
among implicit and explicit false memories regarding the effects of encoding specificity
in incidental learning situations.
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The Role of Encoding Specificity in Incidental Learning:
Implications for Explicit and Implicit False Memories

Most people are familiar with the fact that our memories are far from perfect.
However, most people are less familiar with how perceptual features and the differences
among the kinds long-term memory affect our memories. Our memory is prone to errors,
deviations, and distortions that are often referred to as false memories (Fairfield,
Colangelo, Mammarella, Di Domenico, & Cornoldi, 2017). A false memory is a memory
that is different from what actually happened. The broad aim of this study is to
understand the cognitive mechanisms that contribute to false memories. Some aspects
that affect false memories are perceptual features of information (Kellogg, 2001; Vaidya,
Gabrieli, Verfaellie, Fleischman, & Askari, 1998).
Perceptual features of memories are facets within a memory that are obtained
through the sensory system (e.g. visual information, auditory information, olfactory
information, etc.). Perceptual features can aid one’s memory, as memory is facilitated
when the learning and retrieval conditions overlap, a phenomenon known as encoding
specificity. It is often the case that perceptual features are learned without one’s
awareness or intent, or incidentally. However, the role of perceptual features and
encoding specificity are unknown for false memories. In addition, it is possible that the
different types of memory systems (i.e. explicit and implicit) are affected differently by
encoding specificity for false memories (Ko, Duda, Hussey, Mason, & Ally, 2014;
McKone & Murphy, 2000; Sbicigo, Janczura, & de Salles, 2017). This research will
address the central question: Does encoding specificity affect explicit and implicit false
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memories differently? The current study addresses this question by presenting
information that varies in perceptual features that people are not instructed to learn (e.g.
incidental learning). The goal is to identify whether these perceptual features affect the
creation of false memories differently when the perceptual features match or differ (e.g.
encoding specificity) between learning and retrieval for explicit and implicit memory
conditions. A review of the literature discusses false memory research, types of long-term
memory, incidental learning, and encoding specificity.
False Memory Research
Research is necessary in order to further understand false memories and how they
affect our lives. Researchers study false memories in a multitude of different ways, such
as examining how the framing of questions can affect retrieval and reconstruction of
memories (Loftus & Palmer, 1974), how exposure to information can lead to the creation
of an entire event that never happened (Coan, 1997; Loftus & Pickrell, 1995), and how
mental representations of concepts can cause false memories (e.g. Brewer & Treyens,
1981; Roediger & McDermott, 1995). For the purposes of this paper, the creation of false
memories via the relationship of mental representations will be highlighted.
The semantic organization of mental representations via the semantic network
may lead to the creation of false memories. For example, Brewer and Treyens (1981)
found that participants falsely remembered items as being present in an office room,
when they were in fact not present at all. The researchers attributed these results to the
schemata, or the mental representations of concepts as a way of organizing information.
Schematas can lead to false memories due to the activation of semantic associates.
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Semantic associates are items that are related in meaning and are connected in the
semantic network within our brains. An office room and other items that were present in
an office room (i.e. a desk, writing utensils, an office chair, etc.) are semantically
associated to the items that were falsely remembered (i.e. books). This is a real world
example of false memories brought on by the activation of semantic associates.
Semantic associates, due to the linkage between information within the semantic
network, often lead to intrusion errors, as the associated items (i.e. a desk, writing
utensils, an office chair, etc.) lead to the spontaneous intrusion of other semantically
related ideas (i.e. books). This intrusion is known as an intrusion error, which is one way
that false memories can occur. An important next step in false memory research is to look
more deeply into the underlying cognitive mechanisms behind intrusion errors to
understand more about this type of false memory. There are multiple methodologies to
address this research, however, perhaps the best and most widely used method is the
Deese-Roediger-McDermott (DRM) list learning paradigm (Roediger & McDermott,
1995).
Deese-Roediger-McDermott paradigm. The DRM paradigm is widely used due
to its relevance regarding false memories caused by intrusion errors. In most studies that
employ the DRM paradigm, researchers present a specially designed list of words to
participants that they are later tested upon. The words in this list are special because they
are semantically related to each other. For example, researchers present the words
“glass”, “pane”, “shade”, and “ledge” and other words related to the concept “window” to
participants. However, in most cases, the word that links all the items on the list (the
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critical word or critical lure), in this case “window”, is not presented. Yet, studies
consistently observe that participants spontaneously and falsely recall and remember the
critical word, “window”, from the list (McDermott, 1997; Roediger & McDermott, 1995;
Smith & Randall, 2011). In other words, the DRM word lists consistently produce false
memories of the critical words in the form of intrusion errors.
Theories of False Memories
There are two main theories explaining how false memories occur in the DRM
paradigm: the fuzzy-trace theory and the activation-monitoring theory. The fuzzy-trace
theory (FTT) accounts for false memories by gist traces (Brainerd & Reyna, 2002). Gist
traces are basic essence memories while verbatim memories are exact memories
(Brainerd & Reyna, 2002). For example, if someone were to misplace their keys, a gist
trace would be thinking that the keys are on the key hook just because that is where they
usually are and there is a faint memory of them being there. The problem with gist traces
is that they can be wrong and can lead to error, as they are reliant on faint memory traces.
Let’s say that the keys were in fact on the kitchen counter and there is a precise and exact
memory of them being there. This would be a verbatim memory because the memory
accurately represents exactly what happened. If a verbatim trace is present, it is thought
to be prioritized over present gist traces. According to FTT, gist traces occur when
verbatim traces are not strong enough, resulting in an increase in false memories
(Brainerd & Reyna, 2002).
Although FTT can account for some aspects of false memory creation, there is
much more theoretical and experimental support for an alternative theory, the activation-
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monitoring theory. The basis of the activation-monitoring theory are two cognitive
processes: spreading activation and monitoring (Roediger, Watson, McDermott, & Gallo,
2001). The activation-monitoring theory is highlighted for the purpose of this study.
Spreading activation. Spreading activation is a process that may contribute to the
creation of false memories within the activation-monitoring theory. Spreading activation
refers to the process within the semantic network in which the activation of a collection
of cells associated with a specific concept, like “pane”, spreads to other collections of
cells associated with related concepts, like “shade” and “window”. The semantic network
is the network of neurons in the human brain that connect various ideas and concepts
related via meaning, or semantically. When one semantic associate is consciously
activated within the network, a subsequent subthreshold activation of all other associates
(i.e. spreading activation) occurs subconsciously (Anderson & Pirolli, 1984; Ratcliff &
McKoon, 1988).
The spreading activation in the semantic network works analogously to neural
firing. In order for a neuron to fire, it is required that an action potential meets a threshold
level of activation, referred to as the threshold of excitation. When discussing the
semantic network, the threshold refers to the specific point that is required for
information to reach consciousness; subconscious information is below the threshold
level. For both neural firing and the consciousness threshold in the semantic network
there is an all-or-none law. The threshold must be met; otherwise the neural firing or
conscious activation does not occur. Exposure to a DRM list results in the conscious
activation of words that were presented, such as “glass”, “pane”, “shade”, and “ledge”.
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Subthreshold activation of “window” occurs as well and increases with each presentation
of each semantically related item. When enough subthreshold activation adds up to
breach the threshold, the activation of the non-presented word, “window”, reaches
consciousness. Once the activation of “window” reaches consciousness, there is an
experience of the word, even though it was internally generated by an accumulation of
activation, rather than being presented in the outside world and perceived through the
senses. This makes it likely to experience a false memory of the word. In other words, the
critical word intrudes into consciousness. Thus, this type of false memory would be an
intrusion error.
Another example of spreading activation leading to the intrusion of falsely
remembered information via incidental learning is the office room experiment (Brewer &
Treyens, 1981). In this study, the instructions given to participants were to wait for the
experiment to begin while sitting in an office room. The researchers then moved
participants to the so-called “experimental room” and gave them a surprise memory test
in which they were instructed to recall all the items in the office room they had just left.
The learning of the contents in the office room was not intentional in this study;
researchers did not provide information conveying that there would be a memory test
based on objects present in the room. Therefore, participants were not actively trying to
memorize the items that were present. Most participants reported remembering “books”
as items present in the office room when in reality, there were actually no books present
in the room at all. The recollection of “books” is in fact a false memory created by an
intrusion error. When participants were sitting in the office room, they noticed
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conventional objects that are associated with offices, such as a desk, writing utensils, and
an office chair. Seeing these items initially in the office room activated other related
concepts, such as books. These items were then reactivated during the test on the room
items, when participants were asked to recall the contents of the office room. The
repeated activation of the neurons within the network that represent each of these
concepts was strong enough to breach the conscious activation threshold of semantically
associated concepts that were not actually present in the room (i.e. books).
This process of spreading activation within the semantic network occurs among
cell assemblies and phase sequences. Cell assemblies are groups of neurons that represent
an individual concept, such as a desk or books. Various cell assemblies that are related to
each other in meaning (e.g. desk and books) are grouped together in what is referred to as
a phase sequence (e.g. in this case “office stuff”). Thus, a phase sequence is a collection
of cell assemblies within the semantic network, indicating that a phase sequence is a
collection of semantically related concepts. The neural connectivity between cell
assemblies (individual concepts like desk and books) is strengthened each time a cell
assembly concept (desk) is presented together with another cell assembly concept (books)
(Danker & Anderson, 2010). This strengthened connection facilitates subsequent
communication between cell assemblies (i.e. spreading activation). Ordinarily this
process is helpful in one’s ability to think efficiently, however, this same process may
govern the creation of false memories of semantically related concepts.
The process of spreading activation within the semantic network occurs among
cell assemblies of a phase sequence and contribute to the creation of false memories. The
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DRM paradigm takes advantage of how information is organized in the brain
(semantically) to induce false memories. The words from a given DRM list are
semantically related concepts. Thus, the words on the list represent cell assemblies that
are part of a larger phase sequence. Due to the fact that related concepts are linked
together, when a given concept (cell assembly) is activated, all related concepts in the
phase sequence are sent small amounts of activation (subthreshold) via spreading
activation. With the accumulation of this activation (e.g. from words like “glass”, “pane”,
“shade”, and “ledge”), the likelihood of a highly related item that was never presented
(i.e. “window”) is likely to reach the necessary threshold level for one to consciously
experience the word by having it intrude on one’s thoughts. Spreading activation has
been used to account for the findings of numerous false memory studies stemming from
intrusion errors (Castel, McCabe, Roediger, & Heitman, 2007; Coane, McBride,
Raulerson, & Jordan, 2007). However, there is more to false memories, such as
monitoring processes that occur during encoding and retrieval.
Monitoring. Monitoring is another process that likely contributes to the creation
of false memories via intrusion errors within the activation-monitoring theory.
Monitoring refers to the strategic and consciously controlled supervision of one’s
memory (McDermott & Watson, 2001; Roediger et al., 2001). Monitoring is any memory
process of which the purpose is to determine the origins of activation (Gallo, 2010). This
means that during encoding or retrieval, if there is a conscious attempt to determine the
source of the information, monitoring processes are likely occurring.
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Monitoring during encoding only occurs in intentional learning situations because
one cannot consciously determine the source of information if they are not intentionally
learning the information. For example, when the participants were sitting in the office
room in Brewer and Treyens (1981) they were not intentionally memorizing the items
that were present in the room. Therefore, it was not possible for them to monitor the
encoding of this information, because monitoring requires conscious supervision.
However, monitoring during retrieval can occur when information was learned
incidentally. The participants in Brewer and Treyens (1981) likely monitored the retrieval
of the incidentally learned items in the office room, whether successfully or not.
Monitoring processes must occur to determine whether things are actually present in the
environment or are present in the mind due to external cues when monitoring during
encoding (McDermott & Watson, 2001). For example, monitoring during encoding may
occur in an intentional learning situation in which a participant is studying a DRM
semantically associated word list. Such a situation may involve an active supervision of
whether activation in the brain for a word (e.g. “window) is due to the presence of that
word in the study material or due to internally generated activation. Monitoring processes
must occur to determine whether activation is due to an event that actually occurred or
due to the presentation of associated items when monitoring during retrieval (McDermott
& Watson, 2001). For example, monitoring during retrieval may occur in a situation in
which a participant is tested on their explicit memory via a recognition test of a
semantically related word list that they studied previously. Such a situation may involve
an active supervision of whether or not the memory of the word they are seeing is being
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activated in their brain because they previously studied it or because it is semantically
related to other words they studied (i.e. an intrusion error). Monitoring during retrieval
only occurs when one is using their explicit memory system because implicit memories
are subconscious and therefore cannot be consciously monitored.
False memories can result from errors in monitoring processes, or failing to
accurately monitor the source of the activation that lead to a memory (Gallo & Roediger,
2002). Monitoring has been found to increase correct recollections while decreasing the
frequency of false memories (Gallo, 2010). Research has found that manipulating the
monitoring process influences the accuracy of one’s memory and the frequency of false
memories. For example, altering the way information is stored in one’s long term
memory and repeated testing can affect the monitoring process.
Presenting DRM lists in a blocked fashion rather than in random order increased
both correct and false memories (McDermott, 1996). In other words, presenting blocked
lists improved memory for the lists but also increased the rate of false memories.
Information in a blocked fashion means that things are presented in groups, in this case,
semantically associated lists being presented sequentially. Blocked lists alter the
monitoring processes during encoding because it changes the way the information is
organized and stored in long-term memory. When semantically related word lists are
presented in a blocked fashion, they are stored together not only semantically, but
temporally. Therefore, researchers can facilitate monitoring, which can result in more
memories. The reason that both correct and false memories increased with this
manipulation is that the information became more strongly connected due to the multiple

11

associations (i.e. temporal and semantic). However, it also strengthens the connections to
other related information that was not actually present (Castel et al., 2007). These results
show that monitoring processes at encoding influence false memories. Altering the way
that information is stored within the long-term memory, such as blocked list presentation,
increases both accurate and false memories.
The monitoring process can be influenced by repeated testing. Repeated testing
resulted in more accurate memories and less false memories (McDermott, 1996).
Repeated testing alters the monitoring processes during retrieval due to more frequent
retrieval of the information after being stored in long-term memory. Repeated retrieval
can make it easier to access information because the retrieval pathway within the cortex
becomes stronger each time it is accessed. This strengthening of the retrieval pathway
results in faster retrieval of the information (i.e. neurons that fire together, wire together).
These results show that monitoring processes at retrieval influence false memories
because repeated testing resulted in more accurate memories and less false memories.
Types of Long-term Memory
False memories via intrusion errors can affect different long-term memory
systems. The composition of long-term memory consists of two main types of memories:
explicit and implicit. Explicit memories are those that we can consciously retrieve and of
which we are aware. Implicit memories are a bit more enigmatic in that we are not
cognizant of them and are unaware of when they are affecting our behavior. An overview
of these memory systems is presented below.
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Explicit memory. Explicit memories require conscious thought. Explicit memory
and declarative memory are synonymous because you can consciously declare the
contents of explicit memories. For example, the questions “what did you do for your
birthday” or “what is your name” result in explicit memories because the answers are
things of which most people are consciously aware. Within explicit memories, there are
various subtypes of memory, two of which being episodic and semantic memories.
Episodic memories are explicit memories in which people are able to recall contextual
information (e.g. sensory, temporal, and spatial information) associated with the memory
of the event. So in this case, the answer to “what did you do for your birthday” would
contain contextual information such as, who was present, what you did, the type of cake
(and perhaps the taste of it), and perhaps the auditory experience of the happy birthday
song.
Semantic memories, on the other hand, are explicit memories in which one is able
to recall information, such as facts and other knowledge that is not associated with
contextual information (e.g. sensory, temporal, and spatial information) of the memory of
this event. So in this case, the answer to “what is your name” is not associated with you
remembering the actual circumstance of when you learned your name, you simply are
able to state your name.
Contextual information is not necessary in order to know, for example, that the
word “window” and the word “pane” are associated. However, a connection forms
between semantic memories and episodic memories if one can remember learning about
the words “window” and “pane” during a specific occasion. For example, let’s say
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someone is doing a task in which they are to learn word lists, whether purposefully or
incidentally, of semantically related items, such as “window” and “pane”. Meanwhile,
there is specific contextual information occurring at the same time, such as the smell of
lavender. The information that is being learned (i.e. “window” and “pane”) is becoming
associated with the contextual information (i.e. the smell of lavender) within the cortex.
Knowledge becomes stronger and more resilient with more connections within the
semantic network when such associations occur between the two types of explicit
memories.
Implicit memory. Implicit memories, on the other hand, are memories that are
subconscious. This type of memory is non-declarative, meaning declaration of the
contents of implicit memories cannot happen. This type of memory can change behavior
and thoughts unknowingly. Like explicit memory, there are different types of implicit
memory: procedural memory, learning through conditioning, and priming. The implicit
memory type of relevance to the current project is priming and is detailed below.
Priming. Priming is a subconscious change in behavior that is the result of a
presented stimulus influencing response patterns to either the same stimulus or a related
stimulus that is presented after. For example, let’s say someone is participating in an
experiment on a computer in which the purpose is to indicate the colors of pictures of
objects. Before the person is presented with a picture of a banana, the computer screen
turns yellow for a short amount of time. Afterwards, the person may be able to indicate
that the banana is yellow more quickly than if the computer screen did not turn yellow
first. This would be an example of successful priming. Priming occurs without conscious
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reliving of an experience, making it a product of implicit memory rather than explicit
memory (Ko et al., 2014). Reliable priming occurs in various cognitive tasks through
implicit false memories using the DRM paradigm (Garner & Howe, 2014; Howe, Garner,
Dewhurst, & Ball, 2010; Howe, Threadgold, Norbury, Garner, & Ball, 2013; McDermott,
1997; Sherman & Jordan, 2011). In these cases, the experiment consisted of presentation
of semantically associated words (e.g. “pane”, “shade”, “ledge”) and the critical word
(e.g. “window”) was the answer to an implicit memory task. Various word association
tasks have been used (Howe, Garner, Charlesworth, & Knott, 2011; Sherman & Jordan,
2011) in order to test the priming effects of false memories.
Priming occurs subconsciously and unbeknownst to the person. The person
undergoing the priming does not control the differences in behavior that may result.
There are many kinds of priming, two of which being conceptual priming and perceptual
priming. Either conceptual or perceptual implicit memory tests can measure these kinds
of priming. Conceptual implicit memory tests are tasks that require subconscious
relationships to be made about concepts, such as a word association task. The instructions
for this task are to come up with as many associated words as possible to a word, such as
“pane”. If participants can make associations to the critical word, “window”, conceptual
priming has taken place. Perceptual implicit memory tests feature perceptual cues, such
as a word fragment task or a word stem completion task. The instructions for this task are
to complete the stem/fragment with the first word that comes to mind, such as the stem
“win----” or the fragment “w--do-w”. If one completes these word tasks predictively,
perceptual priming has taken place.
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The present experiment will examine perceptual priming and word stem
completion tasks. Word stem completion tasks are an accurate measure of perceptual
implicit memory because participants are taking in perceptual information before making
their response and are encouraged to quickly produce the first word they think of, without
consideration of a specific correct answer (Sbicigo et al., 2017). Therefore, a word stem
completion task is a valid measure of perceptual implicit memories and, in turn, can
accurately tell us whether successful perceptual priming has occurred.
Explicit false memory research. Use of the DRM paradigm is common in
explicit false memory research (McDermott, 1997; Roediger & McDermott, 1995;
Rummer, Shweppe, & Martin, 2009). There are differences between explicit and implicit
false memories, such as a modality effect in which information presented auditorily
reduces implicit false memories, but not explicit false memories (McKone & Murphy,
2000). This modality effect simply means that information presented visually rather than
auditorily increases susceptibility to implicit false memories. These findings imply that
implicit memory retrieval might rely more on perceptual information, such as visual
stimuli, compared to explicit memory retrieval. Additionally, with repeated presentation
of a word list, more explicit false memories occur. However, implicit false memories do
not show this effect (McKone & Murphy, 2000). Explicit memories are dependent on the
conscious retrieval of information from long-term memory. Therefore, it seems apparent
that additional presentation of information leads to a more concrete basis for a memory in
long-term memory.
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Explicit memory is tested via recall or recognition tasks and can be used to
measure explicit false memories (Dodd & MacLeod, 2004; McDermott, 1997; Roediger
& McDermott, 1995). In a recall task, after having been presented with a list of words,
participants are then asked to report all the words they remember being presented. In
false memory studies, when participants report the critical word (e.g. “window”) it is a
false memory. In a recognition test, after having been presented with a list of words,
participants are presented with words and are asked to identify whether they are “old”,
meaning they have been seen previously, or “new”, meaning that they have not seen that
word yet during the experiment. In false memory studies, when participants identify a
critical word (e.g. “window”) as “old”, it is a false memory. The current study employs a
recognition memory test to examine explicit false memories.
Implicit false memory research. False implicit memories of critical words occur
when semantically associated word lists are presented (Lovden & Johansson, 2003;
McDermott, 1997). These findings imply that the activation that spreads to the critical
word can occur subconsciously. The use of Korsakoff’s amnesia patients is common in
implicit memory research because although their explicit memories are affected by their
disease, their implicit memory system often remains normally functioning (Bechara,
Tranel, Damasio, Adolphs, Rockland, & Damasio, 1995; Evrard, Colombel, Gilet, &
Corson, 2016; Vaidya et al., 1998). This difference is due to the fact that amnesia is often
the result of damage to the hippocampus. The hippocampus is involved only in explicit
memories. Korsakoff’s patients have a smaller than average amount of explicit false
memories of critical words when presented with DRM word lists when compared to
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people with normally functioning memory systems (Van Damme & d’Ydewalle, 2009).
Implicit false memories do not show this effect. In addition to a damaged explicit
memory system, part of this memory disorder is impaired relational encoding, or the
ability to form new associations among concepts (Van Damme & d’Ydewalle, 2009).
Thus, activation of the critical word would not occur in the explicit memory system, but
activation would occur within the implicit memory system. Therefore, implicit false
memories are susceptible to all kinds of relationships (e.g. perceptual and conceptual)
among concepts within amnesiac patients as well as those with normally functioning
memory systems.
Presentation of DRM word lists is useful in studying conceptual and perceptual
implicit false memories (McDermott, 1997). Explicit, conceptual implicit, and perceptual
implicit false memories all occur with the presentation of DRM lists. In McDermott
(1997), tests for these memories included a word association task, a word fragment task,
and a word stem completion task. The presentation of semantic associates was enough to
produce not only explicit false memories, but implicit false memories as well. However,
the role of perceptual details that may influence explicit and implicit false memories is
unknown. This study employs a word stem completion task to examine perceptual
implicit false memories.
Incidental Learning in Explicit and Implicit False Memory Tests
Incidental learning is learning that occurs without the intention of learning.
Incidental learning and priming may seem similar, but are different aspects of a similar
concept. While priming is a change in behavior as a result of exposure to an item,
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incidental learning is a process by which one’s implicit memory can be primed.
Incidental learning can be what happens before priming, but this is not always the case.
For example, let us recall the participant in the experiment identifying the colors of
pictures of objects. When the computer screen turned yellow for a short amount of time,
the participant was not intending to learn anything about the yellow computer screen.
However, when her response time was faster in identifying the color of a banana, the
yellow computer screen primed her response. Therefore, although unintended, the
participant did in fact learn about the yellow computer screen. Incidental learning
occurred, which led to successful priming. When learning is intentional versus incidental,
there are improvements in explicit memory but there are no effects on implicit memory
(Neill, Beck, Bottalico, & Molloy, 1990). Information about an upcoming memory task
resulted in the improvement of only explicit memories (Neill et al., 1990). This means
that correct memories increase with knowledge of an upcoming explicit memory test, and
false memories should decrease, but that such knowledge does not affect implicit
memory. Therefore, in incidental learning studies that measure explicit memories, it is
best to not inform participants about the following memory test.
Incidental learning in explicit false memory tests. While intrusion errors within
the explicit and implicit memory systems can occur when participants purposively learn
the DRM lists, the intrusion errors that result in false memories do not require intentional
memorization of DRM lists. Presenting the word lists as part of a stroop task is a way to
accomplish incidental learning (Dodd & MacLeod, 2004). A stroop task (Stroop, 1935) is
most often a task where words are presented in different font colors. The challenge in this
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experiment stems from the task, as participants are asked to ignore the word (e.g. “red” )
while identifying the font color (e.g. blue). This task is one that most people find difficult
because processing the color of the text requires people to override the automatic process
of reading the word, as evidenced by the errors and time it takes to complete the task. The
current study utilizes one of the many variations of the stroop task.
Dodd and MacLeod (2004) utilized a stroop task in their false memory
experiment. Their study included the presentation of DRM word lists in one of four
colors (e.g. red, blue, yellow, and green). In this task participants were told to only read
the color of the font in which the word lists were presented and to ignore the actual
words. The participants were to indicate the color of the font by pressing a corresponding
key on a keyboard (e.g. red=1, blue=2, yellow=3, green=4). Due to the research utilizing
stroop tasks (Stroop, 1935), an assumption is that the participants still read and processed
the words although the instructions explicitly stated to refrain from reading the word. The
learning in Dodd & MacLeod (2004) is incidental because the participants processed the
information without the goal of memorizing or even reading the word items. Yet, despite
the lack of intention of learning the words, with a surprise explicit memory test,
participants in the incidental learning condition recognized the critical words (e.g.
“window”) as an old word, despite the fact that the word was actually new (Dodd &
MacLeod, 2004).
Participants in another incidental learning study were unable to say that they
remembered the words or explicitly knew that they were presented, yet the test revealed
that they still had an alarming amount of false memories (Seamon, Luo, & Gallo, 1998).
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With the presentation of DRM word lists for extremely short periods of time (either 2, 20,
or 250 ms), participants were not confident about the presentation of certain words during
the short-lived study phase. Despite the lack of confidence, participants still showed an
astounding amount of false memories. The subconscious activation within the semantic
network occurs without evidence that any learning happened at all. Both of these
incidental learning studies show that incidental learning of DRM lists is enough to result
in explicit false memories. This suggests that the creation of false memories via spreading
activation of semantically related associates can occur subconsciously, but lead to
conscious recollections of false events.
Incidental learning in implicit false memory tests. Incidental learning can also
affect implicit memory. There is little literature that delves into the connection between
these two phenomena. However, the research that has been done shows that incidental
learning can indeed prime implicit memory (Tajika, Neumann, Hamajima, & Iwahara,
2005). For example, participants were presented with semantically associated word lists
and one of three types of instructions: control instructions, imagery instructions, or
imagery plus writing instructions. The imagery instructions consisted of imagining a
visual representation of other related words, while the imagery plus writing instructions
added having to write down the related words they imagined. This is an example of
incidental learning because the goal of the task was not to memorize or learn the
presented word lists. Implicit memory tests revealed that for all three groups there was an
equivalent amount of priming for critical non-presented words and actually presented
words. This effect was not seen in the explicit memory test, meaning that participants in
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this group had more recognition for actually presented words than critical non-presented
words. It is not only suggested that incidental learning has great effects on implicit
memory, but also that perhaps the activation of implicit false memories is more
susceptible to perceptual aspects (e.g. visual information) compared to explicit memory.
Encoding Specificity
Encoding specificity is the idea that memories are context-dependent, meaning
that if contextual conditions during learning and test are similar, there is a facilitation of
retrieval of long-term memories, more so than if conditions are different (Tulving, 1974;
Tulving & Thompson, 1973). Encoding specificity effects are not completely dependent
on completely identical conditions across learning and test. For example, scuba divers
were asked to learn information while either on dry land or underwater (Godden &
Baddeley, 1975). An assumption is that the scuba divers were cold when underwater.
Upon being tested, the divers who were underwater experienced facilitated retrieval of
the information with the simultaneous presentation of cold-related thoughts. A
connection was made between the information that was learned underwater and thoughts
about being cold. This means the encoding and storage of information happens together
so there is a facilitation of retrieval when contextual information is present.
Encoding specificity effects are due to the storage of information in the semantic
network. Upon learning information, not only is there storage of the intended
information, but there is also storage of aspects of the learning context along with the
intended information. Arguably, there are connections among all the stored intentionally
learned information and the incidentally associated contextual information in our long-
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term memory via neural connections within the semantic network. Associations form
between categories for information with other cell assemblies associated with the
category, such as associations forming between cold-related thoughts and the intended
information for scuba divers learning underwater (Godden & Baddeley, 1975).
Encoding specificity effects can occur in a wide variety of conditions such as
through perceptual features (Vaidya et al., 1998), environmental factors (Grant, Bredahl,
Clay, Ferrie, Groves, McDorman, & Dark, 1998) and modality of presentation (Kellogg,
2001). One perceptual feature that can have an effect on encoding specificity if
information is presented in a visual text format is font color (Vaidya et al. 1998). What
this means is that people should attempt to have congruent conditions across learning
(encoding) and retrieval in order to improve their memory for learned information.
For example, if one intends to learn information about horses and the presentation
of the information is in a pink font, the same pink font should be used when tested on the
same information about horses. This congruence should facilitate retrieval of the
information more so than if the font color was different, such as green. If aspects such as
these are congruent, memory is better. This is due to the fact that the encoding and
storage of information is synchronized, there is a facilitation of retrieval when contextual
information is present. After learning the information about horses, it is stored in the
semantic network where there may be information about donkeys and mules or other
semantically related concepts. Additionally and important to this study is that a link also
exists between the horse information and the pink font. The connection that is made
between the perceptual information and learned information leads to an increase in
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spreading activation throughout the brain. This facilitates retrieval because there are
multiple pathways to the target information. Reliance on pure memorization of the
information is not necessary when the connections to the information are rich with
contextual details, making them more easily accessible. Upon test on the horse
information, if the testing font is pink then the connection between the horse information
and pink font is more likely to be activated and thus, strong enough to facilitate retrieval.
If the font had been green during the test, the connection would not have been activated
in the semantic network and the information about horses would be more difficult to
retrieve.
The activation process within the activation-monitoring theory and encoding
specificity go hand-in-hand. If concepts are related in multiple ways, the activation of
multiple cell assemblies and potentially multiple phase sequences strengthens the
connection between them. If related both semantically and physically, the cell assemblies
representing word associates (e.g. “pane”, “shade”, “ledge”) become part of an even
larger phase sequence, which now includes those physical characteristics and the brain
regions associated with them (Danker & Anderson, 2010). The physical characteristics in
this circumstance can be any sensory information. The strengthening of the connection
and the increased spreading that occurs with the inclusion of physical similarities among
concepts results in an increased subconscious activation of non-presented semantic
associates (e.g. “window”). Although some research exists, there is not sufficient
research on how encoding specificity affects explicit and implicit false memories.
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Explicit encoding specificity. Encoding specificity is an important variable in
explicit memory (Ray & Reingold, 2003). People are more confident in their explicit
memories when representations in their mind are more substantial (Craik, Rose, & Gopie,
2015). A way of making neural representations of concepts stronger is to provide more
similarities and relationships among them, such as perceptual characteristics. Concepts
with weak neural representations are not sufficient to support explicit memory, but can be
enough to support implicit memory (Craik et al., 2015). Theories such as this support the
idea that implicit memories are more susceptible to perceptual specificity. Therefore, if
learning and testing occur in congruent conditions, stronger implicit memories should
result, more so than if conditions are incongruent. However, these strong effects are not
present in explicit memories.
Implicit encoding specificity. Implicit memories are more sensitive to perceptual
information, such as color, than conceptual information (Engelkamp, Zimmer, & Vega
2001; Tajika et al., 2005). Similarly, color produces a priming effect in perceptual
implicit memory (Hupbach, Melzer, & Hardt, 2006). Color is a reliable method of
showing the effects of encoding specificity within implicit memories. More research on
encoding specificity must be done in order to determine the effects of perceptual
characteristics on perceptual implicit false memories. Perhaps implicit memory is more
susceptible to false memories than explicit memory when perceptual specificity is
involved.
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Current Study
The issue of false memories is one that has far reaching implications. False
memories occur when learning is incidental (Dodd & MacLeod, 2004; Seamon et al.,
1998) and can occur in explicit (Dodd & MacLeod, 2004) and implicit (McDermott,
1997; Neill et al., 1990) tests. It is also known that encoding specificity helps people
remember when the test condition matches the learning condition (Tulving, 1974;
Tulving & Thompson, 1973) and that more spreading activation leads to more false
memories (Castel et al., 2007). However, there is little knowledge regarding the
implication for false memories as a result of incidental learning concerning the encoding
specificity effect. Arguably, encoding specificity should not affect false memories
because the “learning” never happened. Yet, the activation-monitoring theory may argue
that indeed false memories may be rich with details associated with the learning of
similar items and that these memories are very dependent on the monitoring processes
involved in encoding and retrieval.
The current study addresses the role of encoding specificity in incidental learning
and its implications for explicit and implicit false memories. In this study, participants
incidentally learned the contents of DRM word lists via a stroop task. Like Dodd and
MacLeod’s study (2004), participants were asked to identify the font color of a word
while ignoring the word itself. However, in contrast to Dodd and MacLeod, who
presented a given word list in all possible colors, the present study links a given word list
to a specific and single font color (e.g. presentation of words in the “window” list, such
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as “glass”, “pane”, “shade”, and “ledge” were in blue), counterbalanced between
subjects.
To examine the role of encoding specificity on explicit and implicit memory, one
of two different tests were presented to participants, an explicit test or a perceptual
implicit test. Like Dodd and MacLeod’s study (2004), an explicit recognition test was be
used. In Dodd and MacLeod (2004), the test items were presented in a neutral font color
that did not match the original font color from the color identification phase. The current
study adds an encoding specificity component, where for some word lists, presentation of
the items was in a neutral (incongruent) font color or in a font color that matches
(congruent) the font color from the encoding phase. In the congruent font color condition,
it was expected that there will be a formation of associations among the font color (i.e.
blue) and the critical word (i.e. “window”) within the semantic network. Given the nature
of encoding specificity, expectations were that during the recognition test, participants
would have more correct memories for words like “glass”, “pane”, “shade”, and “ledge”
when presentation is in a congruent font color (i.e. blue) compared to the neutral
(incongruent) font color. It was also expected that with the presentation of the critical
word (i.e. “window”) in the recognition test, participants would be more likely to have a
false memory when it too was presented in the font color (i.e. blue) that matches its
semantically associated words, as compared to when the test items were presented in a
neutral (incongruent) font color. Thus, it was expected that when the test conditions
matched the learning conditions there would be higher accuracy for presented words (e.g.
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“glass”, “pane”, “shade”, “ledge”, etc.) and more false memories for the critical word
(e.g. “window”) compared to incongruent font color conditions.
This study sought to address the differences between explicit and implicit false
memories, and thus also employed an implicit memory component. Due to past research
(Engelkamp et al., 2001; Hupbach et al., 2006) suggesting that implicit memories are
more susceptible to neurological spreading in regards to perceptual information,
expectations were that false memories would occur at higher rates in the implicit test
compared to the explicit test. In the implicit test, after incidentally learning the DRM
words via the stroop task, participants completed a word stem completion task (see
McDermott, 1997). The word stems were either in a congruent font color as presented in
the color identification phase, or were presented in an incongruent font color. Like the
explicit test, expectations were that those in the implicit test would have higher accuracy
for presented words and more false memories when the conditions were congruent from
color identification to test phase compared to incongruent font color conditions.
However, there was a difference in expectations between the explicit and implicit
conditions: significantly more false memories and accurate memories in the implicit
memory condition.
The past literature on false memories has not addressed whether incidental or
subconscious learning of DRM lists would result in both explicit and implicit false
memories, or a difference between the two. Additionally, considering the findings that
color encoding is a perceptual factor that influences implicit memories more than explicit
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memories, congruent font color between color identification and test should yield more
implicit false memories than explicit false memories.
Hypotheses/Predictions
Hypothesis 1a. I expected an interaction effect between test type and font color in
false memory frequency. I hypothesized that when participants are tested on their implicit
memory, they would have more false memories than those being tested on their explicit
memory if the font color was congruent between color identification and test. I expected
that if participants were tested in an implicit test, congruent font color would facilitate
spreading activation and thus, would lead to more false memories compared to those
tested in an explicit test. This prediction is in line with findings suggesting that implicit
memories are more reliant on perceptual information than explicit memories (Engelkamp
et al., 2001; Hupbach et al., 2006; Tajika et al., 2005; Vaidya et al., 1998) and that more
spreading activation can also lead to more memory errors (Castel et al., 2007; Gallo,
2010; Roediger et al., 2001).
Hypothesis 1b. I expected a main effect of test type in false memory frequency.
In this incidental learning situation, I hypothesized that if participants were tested in an
implicit test, they would have a higher rate of false memories compared to those tested in
an explicit test. This prediction is in line with findings that incidental learning leads to
more implicit memories than explicit memories (Neill et al., 1990, Tajika et al., 2005)
and that more spreading activation can also lead to more memory errors (Castel et al.,
2007; Gallo, 2010; Roediger et al., 2001).

29

Hypothesis 1c. I expected a main effect of font color and false memories. I
hypothesized that when participants were in congruent font color conditions, they would
have a higher frequency of false memories compared to when they were in incongruent
font color conditions. This prediction is in line with the theory of encoding specificity,
such that congruent conditions at encoding and retrieval facilitates memory (Godden &
Baddeley, 1975; Grant et al., 1998; Tulving, 1974; Tulving & Thompson, 1973) and that
more spreading activation can also lead to more memory errors (Castel et al., 2007;
Gallo, 2010; Roediger et al., 2001).
Hypothesis 2a. I expected an interaction effect between test type and font color in
memory accuracy. I hypothesized that when participants were tested on their implicit
memory, they would have greater memory accuracy than those being tested on their
explicit memory if the font color was congruent between color identification and test. I
expected that if participants were tested in an implicit test, congruent font color would
facilitate spreading activation and thus, would lead to more accurate memories compared
to those tested in an explicit test. This prediction is in line with findings suggesting that
implicit memories are more reliant on perceptual information than explicit memories
(Engelkamp et al., 2001; Hupbach et al., 2006; Tajika et al., 2005; Vaidya et al., 1998).
Hypothesis 2b. I expected a main effect of test type in accuracy. In this incidental
learning situation, I hypothesized that when participants were tested in an implicit test,
they would have greater memory accuracy compared to those tested in an explicit test.
This prediction is in line with findings that incidental learning leads to less accurate
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explicit memories, but does not affect the accuracy of implicit memories (Neill et al.,
1990).
Hypothesis 2c. I expected a main effect of font color and memory accuracy. I
hypothesized that when participants were in congruent font color conditions, they would
have greater memory accuracy compared to when they were in incongruent font color
conditions. This prediction is in line with the theory of encoding specificity, such that
congruent conditions at encoding and retrieval facilitates memory (Godden & Baddeley,
1975; Grant et al., 1998; Tulving, 1974; Tulving & Thompson, 1973).

Method
Participants
The participants in this experiment were 175 Humboldt State University students.
The sample size was determined through an a priori power analysis, using a power level
of 0.8 and an effect size of 0.5. Participants consisted of 131 females and their ages
ranged from 18-46 years old, (M = 20.94, SD = 4.35), all of whom reported having
normal color vision. The participants received course credit or extra credit in their
psychology courses for participating in this experiment.
Materials
Four DRM lists that are known to elicit high levels of false memories (from
Stadler, Roediger, & McDermott, 1999) composed of 15-items each were used and are
presented in Appendix A. The memory tests included words from the four DRM lists and
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included 8 filler word items: anger, chair, flag, shoe, king, needle, rubber, spider. The
filler words were taken from other unrelated DRM lists (Stadler et al., 1999).
Design
This study was an experimental 2 (memory test) x 2 (font color) mixed-subjects
design. The variable memory test was a between-subjects factor with two levels: explicit
test (recognition test) and perceptual implicit test (word stem completion task). In the
recognition test, instructions to participants were to identify whether a given word was
originally presented during the color identification phase (e.g. old) or whether it is a word
that was not previously presented (e.g. new). The implicit memory test was a word stem
completion task. Participants were presented with word stems composed of three initial
letters and were asked to complete the word stems quickly with the first word that came
to mind.
The variable font color was a within-subjects factor with two levels: congruent
and incongruent. The font colors used in this experiment were red, blue, green, and
yellow. In the congruent condition, the word lists were presented in the same font color in
the color identification phase and at test. In the incongruent condition, the font color at
test was presented in a neutral font (i.e. white) that was never presented in the color
identification phase.
The dependent measures in this experiment were recognition memory accuracy
(percent correct) of list items in the explicit test, word stem accuracy (percent reliable
priming) of list items in the implicit test, false explicit memory rate (percent of false
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memories to the critical word in the recognition test), false implicit memory rate (percent
critical words used to complete word stems), and reaction time.
Procedure
Participants engaged in the experiment individually in a lab suite. Both verbal and
text instructions were provided for all participants on how to make color judgements in
the color identification task.
Presentation of the word lists was via a stroop task for all participants, following
Dodd and MacLeod (2004). Presentation of the word lists was in one of the four colors
(red, blue, green, or yellow). Each word list had a color associated with it. In order to
ensure familiarization with the procedure, participants engaged in 72 practice trials (as
per Dodd & MacLeod’s study, 2004). In the practice trials the participants were presented
with a string of asterisks (e.g. *****). Presentation of the asterisks was in a single color
per each trial. Each of the four specific font colors corresponded to four specific keys on
the keyboard (e.g. red=1, blue=2, green=3, yellow=4). Participants were instructed to
indicate the color of the asterisks with the corresponding key. The color identification
phase of the experiment was self-paced and upon each response, participants were
presented with a row of white asterisks to indicate that the next string of asterisks would
appear in 500 ms (as per Dodd & MacLeod, 2004).
After the practice, participants were asked to engage in the same color
identification task, but instead identifying the font color of asterisks, participants were
asked to identify the font color of a text word. Participants were asked to ignore the word,
as if it were asterisks, and continue to identify the color of the font by pressing the same
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keys from the practice trials. In total, there was 48 color identification trials (the 12
strongest associates from each DRM list). Each of the four DRM word lists was
presented in a single font color, counterbalanced between participants (i.e. “window” list
in all four colors, “sleep” list in all four colors, etc, resulting in 16 total conditions).
Common practice when utilizing DRM lists is to present all of the words from a given list
in a specific order, from strongest to weakest associated word, such that each word is
presented one after another until the word list is completed. However, due to the nature of
the current study and the fact that each list corresponds to a specific color, it was
necessary to randomize the color of the words, to avoid patterns among the colors in the
color identification task. The current study maintains the ordering of the words from
strongest to weakest associate, but does so at the cost of presenting an entire list
completely before presenting the content from other lists. Thus for the current
experiment, the four lists were presented in an intermixed fashion, but were linked in
strength of word association. This means that the first four words that were presented
were the strongest associates from the four semantically related word lists and were
randomized in presentation, the second four words that were presented were the second
strongest associates and randomized in presentation, etc.
Participants were not forewarned of the second part of the experiment, the
memory test. Participants were randomly assigned into one of the two different memory
test conditions (explicit or implicit). The presented 36 items in both test conditions are as
follows: the 4 critical words that correspond with each DRM list, 16 standard related
items from each list that were presented during the color identification phase (words 2, 4,
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8, and 9 from each list), 8 weakly related items that were not presented during the color
identification phase (words 13 and 14 from each list), and the 8 unrelated unpresented
filler words. There is a slight variation in the words chosen when compared to Dodd &
MacLeod’s (2004) memory test. This was to ensure that no words with the same first
three letters were presented during word stem completion task.
For both memory tests, the words or word stems were in either a congruent font
color as presented in the color identification phases or a different neutral (incongruent)
color (i.e. white font color). Presentation of two of the DRM lists and the two associated
critical lures were in congruent colors as presented in the color identification phase and
presentation of the rest were in incongruent (white) colors. The congruent and
incongruent lists varied between participants. Presentation of the eight filler words was in
one of the five colors (red, blue, green, yellow, or white) at random. All test words were
presented in a randomized order.
Explicit test. Participants in the explicit test condition were tested using a
recognition task. Participants were presented with the words in a randomized order (as
per Dodd & MacLeod, 2004) on the center of their computer screen. The recognition was
self-paced, meaning presentation of the words continued until participants indicated
whether the word was new or old. Instructions were to respond “/” for old and “z” for
new. Old indicated that the participant did remember the presentation of that word during
the stroop task. New indicated that the participant did not remember presentation of that
word during the stroop task.
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Implicit test. Participants in the implicit test engaged in a word stem completion
task. Participants were presented with three letter initial stems on a computer screen for
12 seconds and were instructed to quickly complete the stem with the first word that
came to mind, following McDermott’s procedure for testing perceptual implicit false
memories (1997). Participants typed their responses using a keyboard.

Results
Data Cleaning and Scoring
The data was collected via E-Prime and processed with R. Outliers for reaction
time for both the color identification task and the recognition test were eliminated from
the analysis and were determined as lying two standard deviations away from the mean.
Using this criteria, 103 cases were omitted from the analysis. Additionally, three cases
were identified as not responding to any of the word-stems and were therefore omitted
from the analysis.
The implicit test data required scoring due to the open-ended nature of the task.
Research assistants scored participants’ responses to the word-stem completion tasks as
either accurate (“1”) or inaccurate (“0”). Two research assistants did all of the scoring,
with each assistant scoring half of the responses. Whenever they were unsure, they came
to a consensus before making a decision regarding a score. Both conservative and liberal
scoring methods were used. In order for a response to be considered accurate
conservatively, it had to be exactly the same word as the word that was expected by
researchers (e.g. participants responded to the stem “sha-” with the word “shade”). In
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order for a response to be considered accurate liberally, it had to be the exact word that
was expected, but misspelled, or had to contain the same base as the word (e.g.
participant responded to the stem “sha-” with the word “shading” or “shades”). The same
procedure took place for false memories (e.g. participants responded to the stem “sle-”
with the word “sleep” to receive a conservative “1” or “sleeping” to receive a liberal “1”).
A reference sheet for the research assistants was created and can be seen in Appendix B.
Responses to the explicit memory test are considered accurate memories if they
are correct in identifying old words as “old” or new words as “new”. Responses to the
implicit memory test are considered accurate memories if they are correct in responding
to a word stem with the expected word that was presented during the color identification
task (i.e. responding to “led-” with the word “ledge”). Responses to the explicit memory
test are considered false memories if they respond to the critical lure word as “old”, when
it is in fact new. Responses to the implicit memory test are considered false memories if
they respond to the stem of the critical lure word with the critical lure word (i.e.
responding to “win-” with “window”).
Analyses
The data was found to meet the assumptions of the binomial distribution. All data
were analyzed using R (R Development Core Team, 2013) and the R packages lme4
(Bates, Maechler, Bolker, Walker, & Christensen, 2009), languageR (Baayen, 2013; cf.
Baayen, 2008), and MuMIn (Barton, 2018). Mixed effects models were used for analysis,
accounting for variance between individual subjects and words by deeming them as
random effects (Baayen, 2008; Clark, 1973). Predictor (dependent) and fixed
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(independent) variables are specified per each analysis. For each analysis ANOVAs were
used to compare each of the models to null models, in order to obtain a X2 value.
Analyses for Each Hypothesis
Hypothesis 1a. It was expected that those tested on their implicit memory would
have more false memories if they were in the congruent font color condition, as
compared to the explicit memory condition. For this model, the dependent variable was
false memory frequency, while the fixed effects were memory test condition (explicit or
implicit) and font color (congruent or incongruent) and were allowed to interact. The
main effect results stemming from this analysis are reported under the results headings
“Hypothesis 1b and 1c”.
Results from the mixed effects analysis show that when scored conservatively
(see Table 1), there was a significant difference in false memory frequency (b* = 1.33, SE
= 0.39, z = 3.42, p < .001, Marginal R2 = .11), between those in implicit memory
condition (M = 0.43, SD = 0.50) and those in the explicit memory condition (M = 0.83,
SD = 0.37) when the font color was congruent. The model was found to be a good fit
when compared to the null model (X2(1) = 11.99, p < .001). The liberal scoring (see
Table 2) showed the same relationship (b* = 1.29, SE = 0.40, z = 3.28, p = .001,
Marginal R2 = .08) between those in implicit memory condition (M = 0.49, SD = 0.50)
and those in the explicit memory condition (M = 0.83, SD = 0.37) when the font color
was congruent, as the results from conservative and liberal scoring were not significantly
different (t = -1.01, p = .31) for false memory frequency. The model was found to be a
good fit when compared to the null model (X2(1) = 10.99, p < .001) Figure 1 shows that
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the interaction is not in the direction that was predicted, such that those in the implicit
memory condition had more false memories when also in the incongruent font color
condition compared to the congruent condition, while for the explicit memory condition
more false memories were found in the congruent font condition compared to the
incongruent font condition.
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Table 1
Hypothesis 1. Conservatively scored model of false memory frequency
Estimate

Std. Error

z-value

p

(Intercept)

1.83

0.47

3.86

<.001***

Condition
Implicit

-2.07

0.30

-6.84

<.001***

Font Color
Incongruent

-1.00

0.29

-3.40

<.001***

1.33

0.39

3.42

<.001***

Condition
Implicit: Font
Color
Incongruent

Note. False memory frequency (Conservative) ~ (Condition + Font.Color)^2 +
(1|Subject) + (1|Word). * p <.05; **p < .01; *** p < .001
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Table 2
Hypothesis 1. Liberally scored model of false memory frequency
Estimate

Std. Error

z-value

p

(Intercept)

1.88

0.52

3.61

<.001***

Condition
Implicit

-1.80

0.30

-5.90

<.001***

Font Color
Incongruent

-1.02

0.30

-3.44

<.001***

1.30

0.40

3.28

.001**

Condition
Implicit: Font
Color
Incongruent

Note. False memory frequency (Liberal) ~ (Condition + Font.Color)^2 + (1|Subject) +
(1|Word). * p <.05; **p < .01; *** p < .001
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Figure 1. Hypothesis 1a. Interactions between memory condition and font color
regarding false memory frequency, scored both conservatively and liberally.
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Hypothesis 1b. The main effect for test condition, as part of the analysis from
results heading Hypothesis 1a predicted that those in the implicit condition would have
more false memories than those in the explicit condition.
Results from the mixed effects analysis showed that when scored conservatively
(see Table 1), there was a significant difference in false memory frequency (b* = -2.07,
SE = 0.30, z = -6.84, p <. 001), such that those in the implicit memory condition (M =
0.48, SD = 0.50) had significantly less false memories than those in the explicit memory
condition (M = 0.75, SD = 0.43). The liberal scoring (see Table 2) showed the same
relationship (b* = -1.80, SE = 0.30, z = -5.90, p < .001), such that those in implicit
memory condition (M = 0.54, SD = 0.50) had significantly less false memories than those
in the explicit memory condition (M = 0.75, SD = 0.43).
Hypothesis 1c. The main effect for font color condition, as part of the analysis
from results heading Hypothesis 1a predicted that those in the congruent font color
condition would have more false memories than those in the incongruent condition.
Results from the mixed effects analysis showed that when scored conservatively
(see Table 1), there was a significant difference in false memory frequency (b* = -1.00,
SE = 0.29, z = -3.40, p < .001) between those in the congruent condition (M = 0.65, SD =
0.48) and those in the incongruent condition (M = 0.60, SD = 0.49), such that those in the
congruent condition had significantly more false memories than those in the incongruent
condition. The liberal scoring (see Table 2) showed the same relationship (b* = -1.02, SE
= 0.30, z = -3.44, p < .001), such that those in congruent condition (M = 0.67, SD = 0.47)

43

had significantly more false memories than those in the incongruent condition (M = 0.63,
SD = 0.48).
Hypothesis 2a. It was expected that those tested on their implicit memory would
have more accurate memories if they were in the congruent font color condition, as
compared to those in the explicit condition. For this model, the dependent variable was
accuracy, while the fixed effects were memory test condition (explicit or implicit) and
font color (congruent or incongruent) and were allowed to interact. The main effect
results stemming from this analysis are reported under the results headings “Hypothesis
2b and 2c”
Results from the mixed effects analysis show that when scored conservatively
(see Table 3), there was no significant difference in memory accuracy (b* = 0.04, SE =
0.15, z = 0.27, p = .78, Marginal R2 = .14) between those in implicit memory condition
(M = 0.29, SD = 0.45) and those in the explicit memory condition (M = 0.65, SD = 0.48)
when the font color was congruent. The model was not found to be a good fit when
compared to the null model (X2(1) = 0.07, p = .78). The liberal scoring (see Table 4)
showed the same relationship (b* = 0.19, SE = 0.15, z = 1.27, p = .21, Marginal R2 = .08)
between those in implicit memory condition (M = 0.37, SD = 0.48) and those in the
explicit memory condition (M = 0.64, SD = 0.48) when the font color was congruent, as
compared to incongruent font color conditions. The model was not found to be a good fit
when compared to the null model (X2(1) = 1.60, p = .21). The difference between
conservative and liberal scoring were significantly different (t = -3.82, p < .001) for
memory accuracy, such that when scored conservatively, there were far less accurate
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memories compared when scored liberally. Figure 2 shows that the interaction is
supportive of what was expected, although insignificantly, such that those in the implicit
memory condition had more accurate memories when also in the congruent font color
condition as compared to incongruent font color conditions.
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Table 3
Hypothesis 2. Conservatively scored model of memory accuracy
Estimate

Std. Error

z-value

p

(Intercept)

0.71

0.18

4.00

<.001***

Condition
Implicit

-1.75

0.10

-18.24

<.001***

Font Color
Incongruent

-0.26

0.08

-3.40

<.001***

Condition
Implicit: Font
Color
Incongruent

0.04

0.15

0.27

.78

Note. Interaction effects: Memory Accuracy (Conservative) ~ (Condition +Font.Color)^2
+ (1|Subject) + (1|Word). Main effects: Memory Accuracy (Conservative) ~Condition +
Font.Color + (1|Subject) + (1|Word). * p <.05; **p < .01; *** p < .001
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Table 4
Hypothesis 2. Liberally scored model of memory accuracy
Estimate

Std. Error

z-value

p

(Intercept)

0.69

0.19

3.61

<.001***

Condition
Implicit

-1.28

0.09

-14.56

<.001***

Font Color
Incongruent

-0.20

0.07

-2.68

.007**

0.19

0.15

1.27

Condition
Implicit: Font
Color
Incongruent

.21

Note. Interaction effects: Memory Accuracy (Liberal) ~ (Condition + Font.Color)^2 +
(1|Subject) + (1|Word). Main effects: Memory Accuracy (Liberal) ~ Condition +
Font.Color + (1|Subject) + (1|Word). * p <.05; **p < .01; *** p < .001
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Figure 2. Hypothesis 2. Interactions between memory condition and font color regarding
false memory frequency, scored both conservatively and liberally.
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Hypothesis 2b. The main effect for test condition, as part of the analysis from
results heading Hypothesis 2a predicted that those in the implicit condition would have
more accurate memories than those in the explicit condition.
Due to the fact that the interaction was insignificant for the memory accuracy
model, separate analyses were done with only the main effects, in order to get better fit
model. Results from the analysis without the interaction showed that when scored
conservatively (see Table 3), there was a significant difference in memory accuracy (b* =
-1.75, SE = 0.10, z = -18.24, p < .001), such that those in the implicit memory condition
(M = 0.27, SD = 0.44) had significantly less accurate memories than those in the explicit
memory condition (M = 0.62, SD = 0.49). The liberal scoring (see Table 4) showed the
same relationship (b* = -1.28, SE = 0.09, z = -14.56, p < .001), such that those in implicit
memory condition (M = 0.36, SD = 0.48) had significantly less accurate memories than
those in the explicit memory condition (M = 0.62, SD = 0.49).
Hypothesis 2c. The main effect for font color condition, as part of the analysis
from results heading Hypothesis 2a predicted that those in the congruent font color
condition would have more accurate memories than those in the incongruent condition.
Due to the fact that the interaction was insignificant for the memory accuracy
model, separate analyses were done with only the main effects, in order to get better fit
model. Results from the analysis without the interaction showed that when scored
conservatively (see Table 3), there was a significant difference in memory accuracy (b* =
-0.26, SE = 0.08, z = -3.40, p < .001), such that those in the implicit memory condition
(M = 0.27, SD = 0.44) had significantly less accurate memories than those in the explicit
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memory condition (M = 0.62, SD = 0.49). The liberal scoring (see Table 4) showed the
same relationship (b* = -0.20, SE = 0.07, z = -2.68, p = .007), such that those in implicit
memory condition (M = 0.36, SD = 0.48) had significantly less accurate memories than
those in the explicit memory condition (M = 0.62, SD = 0.49).
Exploratory Analyses
Exploratory analyses were done looking at the 3-way interaction between memory
test, font color, and word type on memory accuracy, to see if there is a difference in
memory accuracy for new and old words in both congruent and incongruent font colors,
in both the implicit and explicit memory conditions. Similar analyses were not done for
false memory frequency, because false memory frequency only analyzes responses to
critical words. For this model, the dependent variable was accuracy, while the fixed
effects were memory test condition (explicit or implicit), font color (congruent or
incongruent), and word type (old or new) and were allowed to interact.
Results from the mixed effects analysis show that when scored conservatively
(see Table 5), there was a significant interaction (b* = 1.69, SE = 0.36, z = 4.73, p < .001,
Marginal R2 = .19), such that both those in implicit memory condition (M = 0.34, SD =
0.48) and those in the explicit memory condition (M = 0.69, SD = 0.46) had more
accurate memories for old words when the font color was congruent, compared to those
in implicit memory condition (M = 0.30, SD = 0.46) and those in the explicit memory
condition (M = 0.52, SD = 0.50) in the incongruent font color condition. However, those
in the explicit memory condition (M = 0.71, SD = 0.45) had more accurate memories for
new words when the font color was incongruent, compared to when the font color was
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congruent (M = 0.56, SD = 0.50). This effect was not seen for those in the implicit
memory condition (M = 0.13, SD = 0.34), as they had more accurate memories for new
words when in the congruent condition, as compared to the incongruent condition (M =
0.13, SD = 0.34). The model was found to be a good fit when compared to the null model
(X2(4) = 118.56, p < .001).
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Table 5
Exploratory analysis. Conservatively scored model of memory accuracy
Estimate

Std. Error

z-value

(Intercept)

0.38

0.32

Condition
Implicit

-2.30

0.23

Font Color
Incongruent

0.76

0.18

4.27

Word Type Old

0.54

0.39

1.38

Condition
Implicit: Font
Color
Incongruent

-1.10

0.31

-3.57

Condition
Implicit: Word
Type Old

0.65

0.25

2.58

Font Color
Incongruent:
Word Type Old

-1.56

0.22

-7.14

<.001***

Condition
Implicit: Font
Color
Incongruent:
Word Type Old

1.70

0.36

4.73

<.001***

1.18
-10.2

p
.24
<.001***
<.001***
.17
<.001***

.01*

Note. Memory Accuracy (Conservative) ~ (Condition + Font.Color + Word Type)^3 +
(1|Subject) + (1|Word). * p <.05; **p < .01; *** p < .001
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The liberal scoring (see Table 6) showed the same relationship (b* = 1.61, SE =
0.33, z = 4.86, p < .001, Marginal R2 = .12), such that both those in implicit memory
condition (M = 0.42, SD = 0.49) and those in the explicit memory condition (M = 0.69,
SD = 0.46) had more accurate memories for old words when the font color was
congruent, compared to when those in the implicit memory condition (M = 0.41, SD =
0.49) and those in the explicit memory condition (M = 0.52, SD = 0.50) were in the
incongruent font color condition. However, those in the explicit memory condition (M =
0.71, SD = 0.45) had more accurate memories for new words when the font color was
incongruent, compared to when the font color was congruent (M = 0.56, SD = 0.50). This
effect was not seen for those in the implicit memory condition (M = 0.22, SD = 0.42), as
they had more accurate memories for new words when in the congruent condition, as
compared to the incongruent condition (M = 0.23, SD = 0.42). The model was found to
be a good fit when compared to the null model (X2(4) = 111.18, p < .001).
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Table 6.
Exploratory analysis. Liberally scored model of memory accuracy
Estimate

Std. Error

z-value

p

(Intercept)

0.39

0.34

1.13

.26

Condition
Implicit

-1.75

0.20

-8.55

<.001***

Font Color
Incongruent

0.77

0.18

4.26

<.001***

Word Type Old

0.55

0.42

1.31

Condition
Implicit: Font
Color
Incongruent

-0.88

0.28

-3.17

Condition
Implicit: Word
Type Old

0.47

0.23

2.02

Font Color
Incongruent:
Word Type Old

-1.59

0.22

-7.17

<.001***

Condition
Implicit: Font
Color
Incongruent:
Word Type Old

1.61

0.33

4.86

<.001***

.19
.001**

.04*

Note. Memory Accuracy (Liberal) ~ (Condition + Font.Color + Word Type)^3 +
(1|Subject) + (1|Word). * p <.05; **p < .01; *** p < .001
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Discussion

This study examined the relationship between the types of long term memory,
encoding specificity, false memory frequency, and memory accuracy in an incidental
learning situation. The design and hypotheses from the current study are largely based on
that of McDermott (1997) and Dodd and MacLeod (2004). Broadly, the results of this
study suggest that there is indeed a meaningful relationship between these variables that
can be seen when information is learned incidentally.
Spreading Activation and Implicit Memory
In 2004, Dodd and MacLeod found that participants had significant levels of
explicit false memories when DRM word lists were learned incidentally via a Stroop task.
The creation of false memories in this study is attributed to the process of spreading
activation, which occurs even when information is learned incidentally. The current study
extended upon that of Dodd and MacLeod, with the addition of an implicit memory
condition. What was found in the current study supports what was found by Dodd and
MacLeod because we too were able to detect significant levels of explicit false memories
when information was learned incidentally via a Stroop task.
In 1997, McDermott found that participants can be primed by DRM word lists to
have significant levels of both perceptual and conceptual implicit false memories. The
current study extended upon that of McDermott, with some differences in design. The
most prominent difference between the studies is that McDermott (1997) did not compare
implicit and explicit false memory rates. While she was able to detect the differences
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within conceptual and perceptual implicit false memories, she did not make comparisons
to explicit false memories. Additionally, McDermott (1997) did not execute the learning
of word lists in an incidental fashion. McDermott (1997) found that DRM word lists can
effectively prime the implicit memory of participants, leading many researchers to
continue studying implicit false memories. The results from the current study support
what McDermott found, because we were able to successfully prime participants for
perceptual implicit false memories, however we did not look into conceptual implicit
memories.
Interestingly, the results from the analyses coinciding with Hypotheses 1b and 2b
showed significantly less false memories and accurate memories for those in the implicit
memory conditions. The relatively low amounts of implicit false memories and accurate
memories seemingly contradicts what has been found by other researchers (e.g. Tajika et
al., 2005). However, the results from the current study are consistent with the findings
that implicit false memories can indeed be caused by priming of semantic associates
(McDermott, 1997; McKone & Murphy, 2000).
There are several explanations for why our results regarding perceptual implicit
false memories were smaller than expected. One explanation is that semantic priming
may be more short-lived than other forms of priming, such as repetition priming
(McBride, Coane, & Raulerson, 2006). Meade, Watson, Balota, and Roediger (2007)
found that when there are more intervening steps between learning and implicit memory
tests, less false memories occur in semantic priming experiments, compared to when
there are less or no intervening steps between learning and memory test. These results are
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consistent with the theory that semantic priming is more short-lived, and thus, in order to
test perceptual implicit false memories experimentally, there should be minimal
intervening steps between learning and memory test. The present experiment had
participants take a short, self-paced break in between the color identification task and the
word-stem completion task, followed by intermediate oral instructions provided by
research assistants. These intervening steps may contribute to the relatively low amount
of implicit false memories found. Additionally, the fact that in the current study the DRM
word lists were not presented in their traditional blocked fashion, this may further
interrupt the semantic priming between learning and test. Participants were not shown
each list in its entirety before being shown another list, and were instead shown
equivalent associates from each list one after the other, in descending order from
strongest to weakest associate. The way the lists were presented may have made semantic
priming less detectable because there may have been more intermediate stimuli being
shown between the learning and recall of the information associated to a given word list.
Additionally, McBride et al. (2006) puts forward another possible explanation for
our results. In implicit false memory experiments, participants are more likely to begin to
explicitly retrieve information if they connect the study phase (even though the aim was
to study the information incidentally) to the test phase. This is a big issue to consider, as
it may provide alternative explanations for what was found in the current study. For
example, if participants in the implicit condition began to recognize word stems as
belonging to words that were also present during the color identification task, they may
begin completing the stems with those words explicitly (intentionally). Also, during the
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memory test if there are a small amount of non-related filler words present participants
are more likely to consciously recognize the relationship between the words during the
learning phase and memory test. Thus, in the present study as well as others (Tajika et al.,
2005), 8 filler words in the memory test may not be enough to keep participants in the
dark as to the true nature of the experiment. With only 8 filler words during the implicit
memory test, it is very possible that participants were able to see the connection between
the items from the learning phase of the experiment and therefore responded explicitly to
the memory test (McBride et al., 2006; Tse & Neely, 2005).
Furthermore, something that is very important in false memory experiments is
lexical activation. In order for lexical activation to occur, the lexical form of a word must
be present. This means that the word in its entirety must be present, whether it be
presented auditorily or visually in text form. If the lexical form of a word is indeed
present during learning in perceptual implicit false memory experiments, then it may be
repetition priming, and not semantic priming that is at work. To reiterate from earlier in
this paper, repetition priming is the memory facilitation that occurs when an item has
already been presented at least once. For example, if one is presented with the word
“window” during the learning phase of an experiment, and is then tested with the
presentation of the word “window” again (i.e. the item is repeated, hence “repetition”
priming), the person has been primed by the presentation of the same word twice, thus
facilitating their memory for the item. It is common practice in some false memory
experiments to actually present the critical lure word to some conditions during the
learning phase, in order to test both semantic and repetition priming (e.g. McDermott,
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1997). In these cases, the lexical form of the word is actually present during the learning
phase of the experiment and therefore, lexical activation occurs and often results in a
large amount of priming (McDermott, 1997). For example, if some participants were
presented with the word “window” during the learning phase and others were only
presented with semantic associates of the word window (e.g. “shade”, “ledge”, “pane”),
those presented with the actual word have experienced repetition priming from the lexical
activation of the word “window” at both learning and test, while those who were
presented with associates have experienced semantic priming.
Additionally, researchers have found that the implicit memory system may not be
as susceptible to semantic activation, compared to lexical activation (McBride et al.,
2006; Roediger & McDermott, 1993). What this means is that in many implicit false
memory experiments, it may be mainly the lexical activation via repetition priming and
not semantic activation via semantic priming that resulted in significant levels of priming
on implicit memory tests. To further expand on this notion, Lovden and Johansson (2003)
found that verbal articulation mediated the priming for implicit false memories. Their
results suggest that lexical activation is an important factor to consider when testing the
creation of implicit false memories. Therefore, the relatively low amount of implicit false
memories and accurate memories in the present study may be due to the fact that lexical
activation during the word stem completion task did not occur. This was not an issue with
explicit false memories because the explicit memory system is more susceptible to
semantic activation.
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It is important to note that there were a significant amount of implicit false
memories, as found in the results coinciding with Hypotheses 1b, just far less than
expected and far less than the explicit memory condition. The fact that there was a degree
of successful priming for implicit false memories is likely due the monitoring component
within the activation-monitoring theory, proposed by Gallo and Roediger (2002). To
reiterate, the monitoring process causes false memories due to errors in identifying the
source of activation that led to a memory. Participants in this study may have made
source monitoring errors when going through the word stem completion task. That being
said, in order for this to occur, explicit contamination of the implicit memory would be
necessary, because monitoring does not occur within the implicit memory system. This
means that it is possible, as mentioned above, that participants began consciously
retrieving words from the color identification task to complete the word stems, negating
the implicit nature of the task.
Encoding Specificity
Encoding specificity states that when conditions during learning and retrieval are
congruent, memory is facilitated. This concept has been supported by numerous studies
(Godden & Baddeley, 1975; Grant et al., 1998; Tulving, 1974; Tulving & Thompson,
1973), but has been understudied regarding false memories. One would think that false
memories should behave in a similar manner as accurate memories, but this may not be
the case.
The results of the current study found that encoding specificity was supported in
regard to false memory frequency (Hypothesis 1c) and memory accuracy (Hypothesis
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2c). Those in congruent conditions did have more false memories and greater memory
accuracy than those in incongruent conditions, regardless of test condition. These results
are in line with what was expected and what past research has found regarding encoding
specificity (Godden & Baddeley, 1975; Grant et al., 1998; Tulving, 1974; Tulving &
Thompson, 1973). This suggests that explicit and implicit accurate and false memories
are prone to the effects of encoding specificity. There is a lot of support for the notion
that false memories and accurate memories behave very differently, but the results from
the current study suggest that perhaps the two are not as different as we may think.
However, more interesting than the main effects of this study was the interaction
effect that was found between explicit and implicit false memories in Hypothesis 1a. In
this experiment, participants in the implicit memory condition had significantly more
false memories when they were also in the incongruent color condition. Not only does
this seem to contradict what one would expect, given what has been found in support of
encoding specificity, but it seems to suggest that perhaps the opposite is true for implicit
false memories. The results from the current study suggest that incongruence facilitates
the creation of implicit false memories, more so than congruence, despite the findings
that implicit false memories are indeed context-dependent, even more so than explicit
false memories (Tajika et al., 2005).
Tajika et al. (2005) found when the incidental learning of information is more
context-rich, participants have significantly more implicit false memories, even more so
than those in the explicit memory condition who were also in the context-rich conditions.
These results largely fueled my hypothesis that the implicit memory condition will have
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more false memories in congruent font color conditions. However, there are differences
between the two experiments that may contribute to our differences in results. Tajika et
al.’s manipulation of context (2005) was much stronger than that of the current study.
Tajika et al. (2005) utilized different instructions to participants in order to enhance the
context associated with learned DRM word lists (i.e. imagery instructions: imagine the
word in your mind or imagery plus writing instructions: imagine the word in your mind
and write it down). The participants who received more context when learning the word
lists (i.e. imagery plus writing) had far more implicit false memories than those who
received less context (i.e. imagery). This may be why they found such a large difference
between explicit and implicit false memories. Therefore, a potential explanation for what
was found in the current study is that perhaps the context manipulation in this experiment
was too weak.
Although previous research uses font color as a way of manipulating encoding
specificity (Vaidya et al., 1998), more recent research has put forward the idea that
stronger manipulations of context are needed (Smith, Handy, Hernandez, & Jacoby,
2018). Smith et al. (2018) claim that weak manipulations of context make it difficult to
detect contextual effects on implicit memory, because the contextual similarities are not
enough for the subconscious to pick up on. Thus, perhaps it can be assumed that implicit
false memories are more context-dependent than explicit false memories, but more
evident contextual cues are needed. If this is the case, it would seem that this effect would
be a similarity between false and accurate memories. This may explain why the present
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findings contradict Tajika et al. (2005), because those researchers used more rich
contextual manipulations in their study.
Limitations
This study was experimental with great internal validity. Thus, there is a trade-off
at play, resulting in lower external validity. This may mean that there is low
generalizability to real-world experiences of false memories. Additionally, new research
suggests that perhaps a stronger encoding specificity manipulation may have been needed
in this study to really explore the effects on implicit memory (Smith et al., 2018). A way
to combat this limitation in future research may be to use contextual manipulations that
are in line with what was used in Tajika et al. (2005). Additionally, it has also been found
that often times in implicit memory tests, participants often become test-aware (McBride
et al., 2006), especially when a small amount of filler words are presented during the
memory test. This research suggests that it is possible that when participants engage in
implicit memory tests, they may become test-aware, and thus being to consciously
retrieve information, rather than unconsciously. This is an issue because it completely
negates the implicit intention of the experiment. Explicit contamination can lead to
misleading results, as discussed above. To avoid this limitation in future research, more
stringent manipulations to discourage conscious retrieval may be required. Another
option is a post-test question asking participants if they became test-aware. Researchers
can then remove the participants who self-identified were test-aware from the analysis.
Additionally, due to the fact that each word list was associated with a specific
color and we did not want participants to catch on to this, we were not able to present the
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DRM word lists in the traditional fashion. In most studies, DRM lists are presented in a
blocked fashion with each list presented completely from strongest to weakest associate.
The current study presented the strongest associates from each list first, followed by the
second strongest from each list, etc until each list was presented completely. The order of
the presentation of each associate of the same strength for each list was counterbalanced
to avoid the emergence of patterns. Although this deviation from what is normally done
was necessary, it is a limitation because it could have affected the results, because
semantic priming is short-lived (McBride et al., 2006). The clustered presentation of the
word-lists may not have resulted in the desired semantic priming because the words were
not presented in the traditional blocked fashion, therefore the short-lived semantic
priming may have been dormant by the time the memory test occurred.
Implications
Although indirectly, this research adds to the pressing problem of false eyewitness
testimonies in the United States. False eyewitness testimonies are the leading cause of
wrongful conviction in the United States. Since forensic DNA tests in criminal cases
started being used in the 1990s, hundreds of people have been exonerated. Of those
people, over 75% were charged due to false eyewitness testimonies (Wells & Olson,
2003). Unfortunately, some convicts have already served years worth of their sentences
or have even been given a death sentence before they were exonerated by DNA evidence.
These facts are staggering and force one to consider why eyewitness testimonies are still
being used in criminal trials, given all of the research that has been done since the 1970s.
After her work researching false memories, Psychologist Elizabeth Loftus served as an
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expert witness in several court cases, using her research to explain why eyewitness
testimonies should not be used for convictions, or should at least be used with caution.
The work of Loftus and other false memory researchers shows just how easy it is for false
memories to occur, deeming our memories of events extremely unreliable (Loftus &
Palmer, 1974; Loftus & Pickrell, 1995; Roediger & McDermott, 1995). The current study
adds to this literature because it successfully created both explicit and implicit false
memories in participants and investigated the effects of encoding specificity.
Furthermore, many of the methods used by law enforcement and courts have been
shown to increase the frequency of false memories (Douglass & Steblay, 2006). More
specifically, the post-identification feedback effect is the idea that the comments provided
by line-up administrators during identification of perpetrators from a line-up can greatly
influence the likelihood of a false identification (Douglass & Steblay, 2006). For
example, if a witness were to identify a perpetrator from a line-up and the law
enforcement officer confirmed “yes, you’ve identified the correct suspect”, this greatly
inflates the witness’ post-identification confidence later on in the trial.
Other factors that are under the control of law enforcement can influence the rate
of false eyewitness testimonies, such as the selection of the fillers used in a line-up
(Wells, Rydell, & Seelau, 1993), blind administration of the line-up (Douglass, Smith, &
Fraser-Thill, 2005), ensuring that witnesses are aware that the actual perpetrator may not
be present in the line-up (Malpass & Devine, 1981; Steblay, 1997), presenting potential
perpetrators in a sequential rather than simultaneous manner (Steblay, Dysart, Fulero, &
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Lindsay, 2001), and obtaining a statement from witnesses as to how confident they are at
the time of identification (Luus & Wells, 1994).
Researchers have provided recommendations and guidelines to law enforcement
in order to minimize the frequency of false identification, many of which have not been
adhered to. The false memory research that has and is being done by psychologists
should be taken into account more seriously in order to prevent more wrongful
convictions. Additionally, further false memory research should be conducted and made
public so we can try to correct this issue in our law enforcement and judiciary system.
Future Directions
In most cases when an individual is a witness in a criminal trial, the information
that they are being explicitly asked about was often learned incidentally, as they were
likely not attempting to memorize the information present in the environment during a
crime. Thus, in order to learn more about false memories that can lead to false eyewitness
testimonies, more research on false memories in incidental learning situations should be
done, with the addition of aspects to make it more generalizable to criminal trials. For
example, when reflecting on information when you are being questioned by police, there
is a lot of emotion involved, such as stress and fear. These emotions have an impact on
the retrieval of the information that was not present in the current study.
Additionally, more research needs to be done regarding the differences among
explicit and implicit false memories and how they are related to context, as many of the
findings have been inconsistent. The current study found that encoding specificity effects
are great for false memories, but the limitations of the study need to be addressed in
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future research. In regards to criminal investigations, one may interpret the interaction
that was found for explicit false memories as indicating that incongruent conditions
should be implemented to ensure a smaller likelihood for false recognition. This may
mean taking witnesses away from the crime scene for interrogations to reduce the
likelihood of false memories occuring, but this too may be problematic as there may be
detriments to real memory recollection in an incongruent context.
Conclusion
In summary, the present study added to the false memory literature by examining
the difference between false memory frequency and memory accuracy between the
different types of long-term memory and contextual congruence in incidental learning
situations. The incidental learning of DRM semantically associated word lists resulted in
significant amounts of both explicit and implicit false memories as well as explicit and
implicit accurate memories. There were differences in the rates of these variables when
font color was either congruent or incongruent between learning and test, such that, when
in the implicit memory condition, there were significantly more false memories when the
font color was incongruent. When in the explicit memory condition, there were
significantly more false memories when the font color was congruent, as was expected.
Interestingly, the interaction was not significant for memory accuracy, such that there
was no significant difference between explicit and implicit memory accuracy across the
font color conditions. Overall, the explicit memory condition had significantly more false
memories and accurate memories than the implicit condition. Overall, the congruent font
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color condition had significantly more false and accurate memories than the incongruent
condition.
The literature regarding contextual effects on implicit false memories remain
inconsistent. While some studies show significantly greater effects on the implicit
memory system compared to the explicit system (Tajika et al., 2005), this study shows
the opposite effect. Several explanation for these results are put forward, such as the
amount of intermediate steps between learning and test, the amount of filler words in the
memory test, the importance of lexical activation, (McBride et al., 2006) and greater
contextual manipulations may be required to uncover the true effect of context on
implicit false memories (Smith et al., 2018). Future research should address these factors,
as well as implement more stringent regulations in order to avoid test-awareness in
implicit memory tests.
The present results help add to the body of research that has been done by
cognitive scientists regarding the phenomenon of false memories. False memories are
import to research because they can have extremely detrimental outcomes, such as
wrongful convictions due to false eyewitness testimonies. The true differences between
implicit and explicit false memories remain largely unknown and must be investigated
further, in order to come to a more well-rounded understanding of false memories.
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Appendix A
Critical Words With List Items 1 to 15
Words from (Stadler et al., 1999), presented in order from strongest to weakest associate
to critical word (presented in all capital letters). Items that will be presented in the
memory tests are signified with asterisks.

*SLEEP: bed, *rest, awake, *tired, dream, wake, snooze, *blanket, *doze,
slumber, snore, nap, *peace, *yawn, drowsy
*WINDOW: door, *glass, pane, *shade, ledge, sill, house, *open, *curtain, frame,
view, breeze, *sash, *screen, shutter
*ROUGH: smooth, *bumpy, road, *tough, sandpaper, jagged, ready, *coarse,
*uneven, riders, rugged, sand, *boards, *ground, gravel
*SMELL: nose, *breathe, sniff, *aroma, hear, see, nostril, *whiff, *scent, reek,
stench, fragrance, *perfume, *salts, rose

79

Appendix B
Open ended answers result in a variety of responses. For the liberal scoring of the
data, accepted alternatives were credited as accurate or indicative of a false memory, see
table below. For conservative scoring, only the target word was credited as accurate or
indicative of a false memory.
Target word
Breathe
Tired
Bumpy
Salts
Boards
Anger
Smell
Rest
Yawn
Sleep
Open
Shoe
Rough
Aroma
Glass
Scent
Doze
Window

Accepted alternatives
Breath
Tire, Tiredness, Tires
Bump
Salt, Salty
Board
Angry
Smelly, Smelling, Smelled
Rested, Restful
Yawning
Slept
Opened, Opening
Shoes
Rougher, Roughly
Aromatic
Glasses
Scented
Dozing
Wind

Words with the same base word, but different overall meaning are not accepted
alternatives, such as “bumper” instead of “bumpy”
Words that are misspelled are accepted alternatives if they attempted to spell the correct
word or one of the other accepted alternatives above

